Introduction
As with any conflict between a State and rebel groups, the current conflict in Syria consists of both political and legal elements. On the one hand, this conflict may be resolved politically through either force (military resolution) or peaceful methods (peace talks, negotiation and/or mediation) that may be prescribed by the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") under the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, a legal resolution can only be determined through measures that accord with the UNSC's power under both the UN Charter and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome Statute or "RSICC"]. These two methods could be invoked, albeit separately, to find a peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict.
When the UNSC proposed the convening of the Geneva II peace talks between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition, it considered these approaches under the Charter as possibilities to end the conflict. However, when the first session began on January 24, 2014, the topic of discussion was mainly political; in fact, the key legal component of this conflict was not included in the agenda.
The double-pronged objective of this article is to shape the tangible legal component of this conflict and to persuade the parties to the Geneva II peace talks to pay appropriate attention to such legal component in the future. This article consists of six parts, including Introduction. Part two will critically evaluate the effectiveness of the political methods (including forcible measures) that have been undertaken by the UN bodies and the UNSC in attempting to manage the conflict. Part three will discuss the UNSC's peaceful measures for defining the legal nature of the Syrian conflict and its fact-finding missions. Part four will analyze the violation of legal rules governing the rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict. Part five will touch upon crimes committed during the conflict under RSICC. Finally, Part six will suggest a potential legal remedy to the conflict.
The Evolution of the Syrian Crisis and UN Political Measures
The Syrian conflict began with peaceful protests demanding the democratization of the Syrian government in March 2011. 1 When the government attempted an armed suppression, the protesters shifted their demands from 'reforming' to 'replacing' the regime. Shortly thereafter, on July 29, 2011, the Syrian Free Army ("SFA") was established by protesters inside Syria. 2 The Syrian Opposition Council ("SOC") was also formed by the opposition living outside Syria on November 11, 2012.
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SFA began to take up arms against the government forces to defend the demonstrations, and bloodshed ensued. 4 The conflict led to an outflow of refugees streaming across Syrian borders into neighboring countries and eventually to an exigent humanitarian crisis 5 that continues to endanger international peace and security. This humanitarian crisis has tested the effectiveness of the UN political measures " [t] o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" 
The Legal Nature of the Syrian Conflict

A. Fact-Finding Missions
The Syrian conflict represents a significant danger to international peace and security. 27 The UN Charter empowers the UNSC to investigate "any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. 
B. IICISAR
IICISAR has investigated the human rights situation in Syria since the beginning of the demonstrations in March 2011 and has ascertained the facts and circumstances that may have led to the commission of crimes against humanity and has identified perpetrators of such crimes for the purpose of establishing accountability. 32
The IICISAR Reports
Since its inception, IICISAR has produced six reports and four periodic updates that has revealed human rights abuses committed in Syria. 33 The reports are based on interviews with the witnesses and victims inside and outside of Syria. 34 In addition, the factual findings are similar in substance and form throughout the reports. The second report also affirmed that the Syrian authorities had committed serious human rights violations through policies and directives from the highest levels of the armed forces and the government. 42 Although the second report indicated that members of SFA might also be criminally accountable under international law, the Commission acknowledged in the same report that the abuses performed by "armed groups" were not in the same proportion in either scope or administration as the abuses committed by government forces. IICISAR issued its final (Sixth) report on August 16, 2013, 43 which made the following recommendations. 
Legal Rules Governing the Rights and Obligations of the Parties to the Syrian Conflict
The IICISAR reports have defined the legal nature of the atrocities committed in the Syrian conflict as crimes against international conventions. 48 They have also alleged that the Syrian government is responsible for these acts. 49 What criteria, can then be used to identify the legal rules governing the rights and obligations of the parties to the Syrian conflict? The principal criterion that is applicable is international humanitarian law, which includes the decisive grounds defining the applicability of such law to internal and international armed conflicts. The Syrian conflict also has the characteristics of non-international character. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") held:
A. The Geneva Conventions and the Syrian Conflict
The conflict between the contras' forces and those of the Government of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is 'not of an international character'. The acts of the contras toward the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to international conflicts.
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In the Tadić case, moreover, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") affirmed that a non-international armed conflict exists when there is "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."
55 Thus, the ICTY describes a non-international armed conflict having two elements: (1) non-State-armed groups must be engaged in protracted hostilities; and (2) the groups must be organized. Because the Syrian conflict is a non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional Protocol II ("APII") is The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") explained the meaning of the conflicts referred to in this article in its commentary as follows:
… it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-conflicts that are in many respects similar to an international war but that are occurring within the confines of a single country.
In many cases, each of the Parties is in possession of a portion of the national territory, and there is frequently some type of front.
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Note that the control of a large portion of the Syrian territory by SFA is not the basis for applying Common Article 3 58 to the Syrian conflict, although it is strong evidence that the Article should be applied. Instead, Common Article 3 is applied due to the nature of the conflict and the principles embodied in the provision. The basic principles of Common Article 3 would protect the Syrian population and individuals in the armed conflict, but are not sufficient to resolve the serious humanitarian problems caused by the conflict. Further, Common Article 3 does not contain the definition fora non-international armed conflict 59 that can be precisely applied to the current Syrian conflict, like APII. APII is mainly devoted to non-international conflicts with the objective of applying the basic rules of law on international armed conflict to internal armed conflicts, such as the Syrian conflict. APII neither denies the rights of States to use legal means to maintain their existence, nor justifies the intervention of one State into the internal affairs of another, including non-recognition of the legal status of armed opposition groups. As demonstrated through the IICISAR Reports, the scope and criteria for applying APII to any non-international armed conflict are compatible with the Syrian conflict in the following manner. First, the conflict is between the Syrian government forces and SFA. Second, the SFA members act under a responsible command. Third, SFA controls part of Syrian territory and conducts military operations against government forces. Finally, APII excludes low-intensity conflicts such as internal tensions and riots from the scope of its application. 61 Since the Syrian conflict meets the criteria for the application of APII, Common Article 3 and APII could simultaneously be applied to the conflict owing to the APII's scope of application, which is narrower than that of Common Article 3. However, if the Syrian conflict were of a lower intensity and did not meet the criteria for application of APII, Common Article 3 would solely apply.
B. What Has the Syrian Government Violated?
In all its reports, IICISAR has firmly documented that the Syrian forces have engaged in systematic, intentional and widespread violations of international law since 
Legal Measures for the Peaceful Resolution of the Syrian Conflict
A. Applicability of the RSICC to the Syrian Conflict
In its first report, IICISAR confirmed that the Syrian government has violated not only international human rights law and international humanitarian law, but also international criminal law. 69 One of the reports by IICISAR also concluded 70 that these violations constituted crimes under international criminal law, both substantively and procedurally. It urged the UNSC to ensure that criminal procedures are undertaken by submitting the conflict to the ICC when the crimes are substantiated. In this case, IICISAR substantiated that the commission of the crimes, referring to Article 7 of the Rome Statute (Crimes against Humanity). The IICISAR reports have ascribed war crimes and crimes against humanity to the Syrian government as follows.
War Crimes
The first report of IICISAR confirmed that war crimes had been committed by the Syrian government against its own people in a systematically planned manner. IICISAR declared:
The 
Crimes against Humanity
The Rome Statute has established two criteria in defining crimes against humanity. The first is that the crimes are committed against the civilian population without regard to sex, language or political orientation.
75 It distinguishes such crimes from genocide, which is a crime committed against a particular religious or ethnic group. 76 The second is that the crime should be committed as part of widespread or structured attacks without denying the tight connection between the two criteria.
77 'Attacks' in crimes against humanity may be committed by the sState, by non-governmental groups such as SFA or by any national liberation movement, separatist movement or terrorist organization. The Commission also added:
The above conclusion finds support in diverse sources of information. and (c) implemented as part of a policy of "a State or organization," such as Syria or SFA, in accordance with the instigation or consent of the state, such as the death squads (Shabeeha). All IICISAR reports 84 have authenticated these types of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Syrian conflict and have attributed them to the Syrian government. Unfortunately, the UNSC has thrust all these legal efforts to the side to concentrate entirely on the political aspects of the conflict, although the UNSC is capable of invoking legal procedures to settle the dispute.
B. Legal Procedures under the ICC
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Under the UN Charter, the UNSC is the only body that is legally authorized to take action in a conflict such as the Syrian conflict that threatens international peace and security. 87 Moreover, in the context of the Syrian conflict, the UNSC could invoke two procedural options, such as the UNSC`s referral procedure to Ithe CC 88 and the Charter-based tribunal. 89 Of the two options, the ICC would be more convenient because it is currently operating with a wide criminal jurisdiction that covers most crimes committed in Syria, whereas the Charter-based tribunal requires a UNSC resolution, which could be frustrated by veto. Considering Article 8 (1) of RSICC, which provides for the jurisdiction of the ICC over war crimes, 90 moreover, there is little room in which the Syrian government can maneuver to avoid legal action. 91 Although Syria is not a party to RSICC, 92 the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over the Syrian case if the UNSC refers the case to the Court. 93 In these cases, the Court can exercise jurisdiction over accused Syrian nationals without Syria's consent, even if Syria is not a party to RSICC. The ICC jurisdiction covers all perpetrators in this case, including individual Syrian citizens and civilian and military officials. 94 The extension of the ICC jurisdiction may be legally justified under the condition that Syrian governmental officials have acted to commit these crimes pursuant to their authority as instruments of the state. It may be argued, however, that a State can act only through its duly constituted authorities so that official acts may be attributed to the State rather than individuals. 95 However, because a state is a juridical person under international law, it cannot be punished (in such cases). Accordingly, high-ranking officials of the Syrian government, such as the head of State or the foreign minister, are punishable under RSICC for crimes committed in Syria. 96 Finally, it is currently the time to submit the Syrian case to international jurisdiction. A UNSC referral decision on the Syrian case has taken an unreasonably long period of time although UNSC has sufficiently reliable information to refer Syria to ICC, as indicated by the UNHCR 97 on March 28, 2012. Although such a resolution might incite an objection by either or both of the Russian and/or Chinese vetoes, the legal aspect of the Syrian conflict might be placed on the discussion table of the Geneva II political peace talks as a package. In this case, the UNSC members might reach a compromis on the entire conflict just as they unanimously reached an agreement on holding the Geneva II peace talks.
Conclusion
The Syrian conflict consists of both political and legal elements. Thus, the political elements of the conflict may be handled by political measures, while the legal elements can be settled through legal measures under provisions of the UN Charter and Article 13(b) of RSICC. Because both elements are inseparable in their effects on the Syrian people, the political and legal methods for settling them would be complementary to one another in the peace process. The attempts by the appropriate UN bodies to resolve the Syrian conflict based on these two methods may be assessed as follows. First, the UNSC's measures to resolve the Syrian conflict (including the use of forcible measures but excluding legal methods) have thus far failed to manage the conflict because of the veto system inherent in UNSC, except that it did convene the Geneva II peace talks on January 24, 2014 that have not (as of this writing) reached a concrete outcome. Second, the UNSC has not effectively handled the legal measures, i.e., the UN fact-finding missions that have investigated the legal aspects of the Syrian conflict. Notably, these missions determined that the Syrian conflict was characterized by the widespread and intentional commission of international crimes that were mostly attributed to the Syrian government.
Consequently, the author would recommend defining and analyzing the substantive legal rules that govern the rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict, as well as which of these substantive rules have been violated by the Syrian government. There are very good legal bases for the assessment whether crimes have been committed by the Syrian government. One is the legal measures which would substantiate the commission of such crimes under RSICC. The other is certain legal procedures that are yet to be implemented by the UNSC in the Syrian conflict. The UNSC is obligated to invoke such procedural legal measures embodied in the UN Charter and RSICC by submitting the entire conflict to the ICC before or simultaneously with the peace talks on the Syrian conflict. Eventually, the case should be decided under such jurisdiction as a legal remedy for the Syrian people, which would presumably be an integral component of comprehensive peace process to resolve the conflict.
